European Diary: Paris, October 2021

In Paris, intellectuals are taken much more seriously than elsewehere. On French television, frequently there are long and animated debates about ideas. Books sometimes become sensations. The French would not say flippantly like the English: What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind. When I was growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, the most famous Parisian intellectuals were the writer couple Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. They frequented the Café de Flore on the left bank of the Seine and were deeply hostile to the West, although they both, as existentialists, promoted the self-expression denied to individuals in communist countries. With their passing, the best-known intellectual celebrity of Paris became Michel Foucault who taught at the prestigious Collège de France, denouncing all hierarchies, however useful they might be, and adopting various left-wing causes.

Why Were They Not Cancelled?

Those three Parisian luminaries were however guided less by reason than passion, or even lust. Sartre and Beauvoir, who were themselves in an open relationship, used their exalted position in intellectual circles to exploit impressionable youngsters. Bianca Bienenfeld was a seventeen-year-old student at a French lycée (grammar school, senior high school) when she was seduced by her teacher Beauvoir who then passed her on to Sartre, while finally they abandoned her, as she describes in a memoir, A Disgraceful Affair. Natalie Sorokin was also seventeen years when she was Beauvoir’s student and seduced by her. Her mother complained to the authorities, and Beauvoir lost her job and had her teaching licence suspended. The young actress Olga Kosakiewicz had affairs with both Sartre and Beauvoir and later said, like Bienenfeld and Sorokin, that the couple left deep emotional scars. When Foucault briefly taught philosophy in Tunisia, he was reputed to have abused very young Arab boys, desperately poor and ready to accept his gifts. His defenders retort angrily that his sexual partners in Tunisia may have been older than alleged, seventeen or eighteen years. In their eyes, that seems to make all the difference.

Of course, a serious debate with those intellectuals should focus on their ideas and arguments, not on their personal preferences and private lives. Raymond Aron has subjected French leftism to a searching critique in the Opium of the Intellectuals (1957) and History and the Dialectic of Violence (1975). Sir Roger Scruton has perceptively analysed the works of both Sartre and Foucault in his Fools, Frauds, and Firebrands (2017). It is nevertheless a relevant question why Sartre, Beauvoir and Foucault have not been much affected by the present and powerful ‘cancel culture’, despite their abuse of vulnerable teenagers. I can think of at least one answer: They were anti-Establishment intellectuals of the Left, whereas the advocates of ‘cancel culture’ are mainly looking for Establishment targets.

Antipathy Towards the Rich

Today, probably the best-known Parisian luminary is the economist Thomas Piketty, the author of the best seller Capital in the 21st Century, the title being a direct reference to The Capital by Karl Marx. Indeed, the book, a massive tome, can be regarded as an updated version of Marx’ book. Gone is the prophecy about the inevitable collapse of capitalism, but what is kept is the antipathy towards the rich. Piketty repeatedly quotes from yet another famous Parisian, Honoré de Balzac, whose celebrated novel, Père Goriot, takes place in Paris during a few months in 1819–1820. Piketty claims that the story illustrates what kind of society is being developed by 21st century capitalism, with the rich becoming ever richer and wealth clinging obstinately to some families. According to him, the French nineteenth-century novelist ‘depicted the effects of inequality with a verisimilitude and evocative power that no statistical or theoretical analysis can match’. Piketty asserts that ‘inherited wealth comes close to being as decisive at the beginning of the twenty-first century as it was in the age of Balzac’s Père Goriot’ and that this novel reveals ‘the cynicism of a society entirely corrupted by money’.

The Fragility of Wealth

When I read Piketty’s book, I found these assertions surprising: Balzac’s novel could be read quite differently. I persuaded an American foundation, Liberty Fund in Indianapolis, to hold a colloquium in Paris on Balzac and capitalism on 28–31 October 2021. It took place at the Hilton Opera, but the night before it began I went with a friend to one of the best restaurants in Paris, L’Ambroisie in Place des Vosges, a Michelin three-star restaurant. The food was exquisite, very French indeed, and to my quiet amusement the waiters were just as arrogant as the intellectuals on the Left Bank.

In the lively discussion at the colloquium in the next few days, other participants and I pointed out that the chief protagonists of Balzac’s novel are all in thrall to their passions, not to money except as a means. Old Goriot has transferred almost all his wealth to his two ungrateful daughters and lives modestly in a boarding house. One of his daughters desperately needs money to pay the gambling debts of her lover. The other daughter has seen her husband use her dowry on speculation, with no certainty that its value will be maintained or increased. Another resident in the boarding house, Vautrin, turns out to be a runaway prisoner who had assumed responsibility for a crime he had not committed, because he had passionately loved the real perpetrator. Thus, the novel is really about the fragility of capital and the frailty of human beings. They are not corrupted by money but rather by passions which they cannot completely control. Indeed, Balzac refutes Piketty.

(Column in The Conservative, November 2023.)

European Diary: Akureyri, October 2021

Most of Iceland’s population live in the southwestern corner of the country, in the capital Reykjavik, and in towns nearby. The only sizeable town elsewhere is Akureyri in the north of the island, a busy port, the site of flourishing fishing firms and a service centre for the adjacent rural regions. It is a nice little place, peaceful and pleasant, although an unkind (and unfair) joke about it is that it is a wonderful place until the locals wake up. The region has been inhabited since the settlement of Iceland in late ninth century. Its first settler was Helgi the Skinny Eyvindsson who was of Swedish and Irish origin. He got his nickname because his parents had for two years left him in the Hebrides with people who so starved him that when the parents picked him up they could hardly recognise him. Helgi the Skinny was a nominal Christian unlike most other Icelandic settlers, but he prayed to the heathen god Thor when at sea or in battle.

Aquinas’ Politics of Imperfection

On 6 October 2021, Akureyri was the venue of an international conference on policing and crime where I gave a paper. My topic was so-called victimless crimes which I argued should not be illegal, although some of them might be vices. In my support I quoted one of the eminent philosophers I discussed in my recent two-volume work, Twenty-Four Conservative-Liberal Thinkers, St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, ii, Question 96, Article 2): ‘Now human law is made for the multitude of men, and the greater part of this multitude consists of men who are not perfected in virtue. And so not all the vices from which virtuous men abstain are prohibited by human law. Instead, the only vices prohibited are the more serious ones, which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain from—especially those vices which are harmful to others and without the prohibition of which human society could not be conserved. For instance, homicide and theft and other vices of this sort are prohibited by human law.’

Prostitution and Pornography

In this connection, I discussed four somewhat disreputable activities, prostitution, pornography, insider trading and tax avoidance. Radical feminists hold that prostitution and pornography are not victimless: on the contrary, they say that both these activities involve the degradation and exploitation of women and should be banned. In my talk, I agreed with them that prostitution was degrading, but not only for women but rather for all who participated in them. Aquinas would have said that they were vices from which virtuous men should abstain. But this did not necessarily mean that they should be prohibited by law, I added. Probably, the consequences of prohibiting prostitution and pornography were worse than the consequences of tolerating and quietly monitoring these activities. I also pointed out that the internet had largely removed the rogue intermediaries who had in the past oppressed prostitutes and porn actresses (and actors). Now sex workers were often in direct contact with their customers online. This at least weakened the argument from exploitation. The limited resources of the police should be spent on suppressing vices harmful to others, as Aquinas had sensibly suggested.

Insider Trading

In my talk, I observed that the widely-held idea that insider trading was harmful was not necessarily plausible. How could you lose money on stock you did not own? It was wrong, I submitted, to conceive of it as a loss for someone if he or she did not make the same profit from trading in stocks as an insider did. Of course the insider information should be obtained legally and not fraudulently, not by breach of trust. Moreover, insider trading arguably increased efficiency in that it hastened the adjustment of the market to new information. It tended to correct situations in which some companies were valued below or above their real worth. I mentioned a famous example Aquinas used about a merchant from Alexandria who arrived in Rhodos after a famine. He brought a lot of desperately needed wheat on his ship, but he knew unlike the islanders that more ships were on their way. Did he have to reveal this ‘inside’ information? Aquinas replied: No. The merchant would be generous if he did so, but he did not act unjustly by not disclosing his educated guess that the supply would soon increase. Generosity might be a moral duty, but it was not, and should not be, a legal duty.

Tax Avoidance

In my talk I emphasised the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax evasion was usually both immoral and illegal, and it was plausible to regard it as indirectly harmful. Thus it was not only a vice, but should also be regarded as a crime, at least according to Aquinas. On the other hand, there was nothing wrong with tax avoidance when it simply meant that you tried not to pay more in taxes than you were obliged to do. It was no more wrong than when you wanted to travel and you searched online for the best airfare. Those who criticised it seemed to assume that the given level of taxation was optimal, which was hardly ever the case. Indeed, the possibility to move from one country to another was an indispensable source of information about the preferences of taxpayers, how much they wanted government to provide of public goods. It was also a necessary constraint on government. Tax avoidance was not only about the mobile rich transferring assets to low-tax countries. It was also about ordinary people responding to a heavy tax burden by switching from work to leisure. The main reason, for example, that the Europeans worked fewer hours than the Americans was that their income was taxed much more. Excessive taxation shrunk the tax base. I concluded that tax avoidance was not only useful, but that it was also a virtue rather than a vice, because it was an instance of thriftiness. Needless to say, some in the audience gasped at my audacity.

(Column in The Conservative November 2023.)

European Diary: Lisbon, September 2021

During the Covid Epidemic, I spent fifteen months grounded in Iceland, almost as if under house arrest, although it must be said that the government measures there were much milder than in many other Western countries. It was therefore quite a relief when I could travel again. One of my first trips abroad after the Epidemic was to Portugal. The Brussels research institute New Direction held a ‘Think Tank Central’ in Lisbon 22–25 September 2021 where representatives from many institutes and associations in Europe and North America discussed how to meet challenges from the Left. The think tanks participating included, besides New Direction, the Austrian Economics Center in Vienna, the Danube Institute in Budapest, the Edmund Burke Foundation in the Hague, the Ayn Rand Institute in Santa Ana, California, Americans for Tax Reform in Washington DC, Centre for Policy Studies in London, CEPOS in Copenhagen, the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, Oikos in Stockholm, the Freedom Association in London, Civismo in Madrid and Disenso, also in Madrid.

Four Reasons for Leftist Gains

In my talk at the conference, I pointed out that the Left has recently made significant gains in the West, especially among young people, despite the total failure of the socialist project. I identified four reasons for this perhaps surprising trend. 1) The common enemy that in the Cold War had united the Right (as a shorthand description of conservatives and classical liberals defending Western civilisation) had suffered an ignominous defeat. Communism had collapsed, not with a bang, but a whimper. 2) With the general acceptance of capitalism the Right has been deprived of its strongest argument against the Left, economic efficiency, brought about by private property and free trade. 3) An ever-larger proportion of voters has become dependent on government for their livelihood, either as public employees or welfare recipients. 4) The Marxists, in various guises, have taken over the media and the schools, producing a new left-wing generation susceptible to wokeism, ecofundamentalism and other delusions.

I insisted however that the Leftist triumph was not inevitable. The Right need not retreat, and some trends may serve to build up anew or strengthen a common cause. 1) China has started a new cold war which might induce the West to unite. 2) Many of the more fanciful spending programmes of the Left will utterly fail, and be seen to fail. 3) In countries where the Right comes into power, it should try to reduce the number of government employees and welfare recipients, not least because the need for welfare benefits has greatly diminished with increased prosperity. 4) Even if the Right should not try to limit the Left’s freedom of speech, it need not spend taxpayers’ money on its propaganda in the media and schools. 5) First and foremost, I said, the Right has to meet the intellectual challenge from the Left with arguments and evidence for the four principles which defines it: private property, free trade, limited government and respect for tradition. In particular, I mentioned the huge global network of active and effective free-market think tanks which have demonstrated time and again that government was more often the problem than the solution.

Thatcher’s Historical Role

I used the opportunity in Lisbon to meet with old friends, including Dr. Barbara Kolm from Austria, Dr. Yaron Brook from the United States, and Robert Tyler from the United Kingdom (now working in Brussels). Some of us had a memorable dinner at the Michelin one-star restaurant Eleven in Lisbon. It serves Mediterranean cuisine, with excellent Portuguese wines, and can be unreservedly recommended. The food is delicious, and it is not as pretentious as many other Michelin restaurants. No less memorable was the insightful speech at the Margaret Thatcher Dinner by John O’Sullivan, one of Thatcher’s assistants as Prime Minister and now Director of the Danube Institute. He emphasised that when she formed her first government in 1979 the triumph of Thatcherism was by no means a foregone conclusion. It took determination and courage to accomplish what she did which was to put the Great back into Britain and to defeat both the Argentinian junta and the extremists in the National Union of Miners. O’Sullivan concluded however that Thatcher’s greatest contribution was that she not only supported ‘vigorous virtues’ like hard work, thriftiness, prudence, diligence, sobriety and self-control, but that she herself incarnated them.

Lisbon in the 11th Century

For me, the trip to Lisbon had a special relevance for an additional reason. In 2005, I had organised in Iceland a meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, an international academy of scholars and men of affairs trying to define, defend and extend individual freedom. Two of the participants, John Nugeé from England and Gabriel Stein from Sweden, both working as financial analysts in the City of London, became interested in the Icelandic Commonwealth. It had been formed in 930, mainly by Norwegian refugees who did not want to pay taxes to the newly-formed monarchy. The Commonwealth lasted to 1262 and it had no king but the law, as a German chronicler once put it. Nugeé and Stein decided to write a novel about the Icelanders’ yearning for freedom. It was finally published in late 2021, Sailing Free, a lively and well-written work. It is about the two Icelandic brothers Gudmundr and Kari. Gudmundr stays at the family farm and gets entangled in various local affairs, whereas Kari trades abroad and goes all the way to Lisbon where he has some exciting adventures. When Kari returns home, he has to argue for Iceland’s ancient liberties against threats from the Norwegian king, the Roman Church and their Icelandic accomplices. The novel takes place in the 11th century, and here I was in Lisbon, in the 21st century, a thousand years later, still exploring the same questions as Kari the trader—justice, order, and sovereignty.

(Column in The Conservative in October 2023.)

European Diary: The Escorial, June 2021

Finally the Plague was over. My first trip abroad after the Covid Epidemic was in June 2021 to Madrid where I lectured at the Summer University organised jointly by the Brussels research institute New Direction and the Spanish think tank Fundación Civismo. It was held at the Escorial, the palace built near Madrid in 1563–1584 by King Philip II of Spain.

On 14 June two eminent Spanish scholars, Pedro Schwartz, Research Professor of Economics at the CEU San Pablo University in Madrid, and Francisco José Contreras, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Sevilla and Member of the Spanish Parliament for Vox, gave interesting presentations on liberalism and conservatism, to which I subsequently responded. I have known Professor Schwartz for more than forty years as a fellow member of the international academy of classical liberal and conservative scholars, the Mont Pelerin Society, founded by Anglo-Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich von Hayek in 1947. Schwartz, a disciple of Anglo-Austrian philosopher Karl R. Popper at the London School of Economics, was President of the Mont Pelerin Society in 2014–2016. Although in 2021 he was already 86 years, he was as lively and eloquent a speaker as ever. Almost thirty years younger than Schwartz, Contreras also contributed many insights at the Summer School. He belongs to a group of Spanish scholars who are trying to counter attempts by left-wing intellectuals to distort history, not least Spanish history.

The Common Ground

In my first talk, I agreed with Schwartz and Contreras that there is today much common ground between conservatives and classical liberals although some kinds of conservatisms are illiberal whereas some kinds of liberalisms are anti-conservative (for example romantic individualism which replaces the principle of liberty under the law with the demand for unrestricted self-expression). I described the long tradition of what could be called conservative liberalism, tracing it all way back to the thirteenth century, to Icelandic chronicler Snorri Sturluson and Italian philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas. In both thinkers, the twin ideas of government by consent and the right to rebel against tyrants were present, although the conservative-liberal tradition was later more systematically articulated by John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, the recognised authors of classical and conservative liberalism.

Perhaps the main difference between conservative liberalism and other kinds of liberalism can be brought out by contrasting interpretations of four revolutions in Western history. Conservative liberals supported the 1688 British Revolution and the 1776 American Revolution because they were made in order to preserve and extend existing liberties, whereas they opposed the 1789 French Revolution (as it evolved after a promising beginning) and the 1917 Russian Revolution because they were made in order to reconstruct the whole of society by a small political sect and to impose the values held by this sect on the rest. The four leading principles of conservative liberalism, I said, were private property, free trade, limited government, and respect for traditions. I added that in my opinion von Hayek had offered a profound synthesis of conservative insights and classical liberal principles with his theory of inevitable individual ignorance which could only be overcome by the discovery process of a free society. In my second talk, I discussed my recent book in two volumes, Twenty-Four Conservative-Liberal Thinkers.

Reflections in the Escorial

In the Escorial there is a monastery, and the monks kindly took us on a special tour of the immense palace, the world’s largest Renaissance building. We saw the surprisingly modest offices of King Philip II from which he tried, with scant success, to rule the Spanish Empire. He strove hard to keep the rebellious Netherlands under his control, and there is little doubt that Spanish novelist Miguel Cervantes was alluding to him when describing the battle of Don Quixote against what turned out to be windmills, by no coincidence an almost integral part of Dutch landscape. Indeed, Cervantes’ celebrated novel can be read as a parody of the futile and ultimately absurd project of trying to conquer foreign and distant countries, the quixotic battle against windmills.

Walking around in the Escorial, I could not resist reflecting on Spanish history. One lesson from it is the tragic mistake committed by the grandparents of Philip II, Ferdinand and Isabel, when they drove the Jews out of Spain, thereby losing some of their most enterprising subjects. Russian-American thinker Ayn Rand posed a challenging question in her novel Atlas Shrugged: What happens if the most productive elements of society must leave? Spain provides one answer: Stagnation (and then, of course, we are ignoring all the personal tragedies). Another and more uplifting lesson of Spanish history is the relatively smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 1970s, where the monarchy played a crucial role, ensuring continuity and stability. It facilitated this transition that under Francisco Franco Spain was never a completely totalitarian country. It had many more foci or centres of authority than government, besides the royal family perhaps most importantly the Church and the business community. Liberty can sometimes be an unintended consequence of authority being dispersed.

(Column in The Conservative October 2023.)

When I studied philosophy in Reykjavik and Oxford long ago, one of the classic topics of discussion in classes were whether merchants could deny service to individuals on the basis of who they WERE and not what they HAD DONE (or said). I personally wanted as much freedom to choose one’s customers as possible (both ways, for buyers as well as sellers). But most philosophers think it is immoral and should also be illegal if for example hotels or restaurants refuse serving women, Blacks, Germans, or Jews, just because they are women, Blacks, Germans, or Jews. (Some would include gays, while others would argue, perhaps less plausibly, that being gay is a matter of choice and therefore a way of acting, not only being.)

Now Mr. Ingi Sverrisson who runs a licensed Icelandic tour company, tour.is, has refused to serve Israeli tourists in Iceland. He even tells the media that he is organising a concerted action of tour companies to deny any services to Israeli tourists. He gives as his reason that the Israeli Defence Force, IDF, is killing babies in Gaza. When asked about what Hamas did to Israeli babies, he says that he is not defending that but that a much smaller number of babies were killed by them. It is clear that under Icelandic law (No. 85/2018, article 1) Mr. Sverrisson’s action is illegal and that his license ought to be revoked immediately (if the law is taken seriously). This seems to be a task for the Icelandic authorities and perhaps also for the Jewish Anti-Defamation League and others concerned.

But Mr. Sverrisson’s position raises some fascinating moral issues. He does not, for example, make a distinction between intentionally killing babies, often in the most gruesome fashion, like Hamas did, and babies losing their lives in a war, where there was no intention of killing them, but where they were used as human shields by Hamas. (What about the babies of Coventry or Dresden in the Second World War? Or in Kyiv today?) Neither does he provide an answer to the question at which point he would feel compelled to take action: Obviously not with 500 babies killed by Hamas as in Israel. But would 1,000 suffice? Or 5,000? Is his company, tour.is, also denying service to Chinese and Russian tourists? After all, China is busy killing Uyghur babies while Russia is killing an untold number of Ukrainian babies. Or is moral indignation to be reserved for Jews alone?

Evrópska hugveitan New Direction hélt 20.–22. september 2023 fjölmennt þing í Madrid, þar sem hægri menn báru saman bækur sínar og sóttu hinn árlega kvöldverð í minningu Margrétar Thatchers. Ræðumaður var Robin Harris, sem var ræðuskrifari Thatchers og ævisöguritari.

Ég mælti á þessari ráðstefnu með samstarfi frjálshyggjumanna og íhaldsmanna. Ég leiddi rök að því, að til væri frjálslynd íhaldsstefna, sem sameinaði óvéfengjanleg rök frjálshyggjumanna fyrir viðskiptafrelsi, einkaeignarrétti og valddreifingu og sterka tilfinningu íhaldsmanna fyrir því, að menn yrðu að eiga einhvers staðar heima, vera hluti af stærri heild, öðlast samkennd.

Einn íhaldsmaðurinn á ráðstefnunni minntist á samnýtingarbölið (tragedy of commons), þegar ótakmarkaður aðgangur að takmarkaðri auðlind veldur ofnýtingu hennar. Ég svaraði því til, að hagfræðingar hefðu bent á sjálfsprottna samvinnu til að takmarka slíkan aðgang og útrýma bölinu. Íslenska kvótakerfið væri gott dæmi. Ég benti á, að í Afríku, þar sem sumir stofnar fíla og nashyrninga væru í útrýmingarhættu, mætti með einu pennastriki breyta veiðiþjófum í veiðiverði: með því að skilgreina eignarrétt afrískra þorpsbúa á þessum stofnum og leyfa eðlilega nýtingu þeirra í stað þess að reyna að friða þá.

Ég tók undir það með íhaldsmönnum, að mannlífið væri ekki samsafn óháðra einstaklinga. Allir yrðu að eiga sér einhverjar rætur, bindast öðrum einhverjum böndum, virða arfhelgar venjur og hefðir. Hins vegar hafnaði ég þeirri skoðun, sem heyrðist á þinginu, að siðferðilegar skuldbindingar okkar næðu aðeins að þjóðinni. Þær ná líka til alls mannkyns, þótt slíkar skuldbindingar séu eðli málsins samkvæmt mjög takmarkaðar og felist aðallega í að láta aðra í friði.

(Fróðleiksmoli í Morgunblaðinu 11. nóvember 2023.)

Strax eftir stríð urðu fjörugar umræður á Norðurlöndum um framtíðartilhögun stjórnmála. Í Svíþjóð og á Íslandi snerust umræðurnar aðallega um þann boðskap Friedrichs von Hayeks, að sósíalismi færi ekki saman við lýðræði. Smám saman hurfu vinstri menn í báðum löndum þó frá róttækustu hugmyndum sínum.

Í Danmörku tóku umræðurnar á sig aðra mynd. Þar skrifuðu tveir kommúnistar, báðir prófessorar, Jørgen Jørgensen í heimspeki og Mogens Fog í læknisfræði, sumarið 1945 greinar í blöð um, að stríðið hefði sýnt, að ekki mætti leyfa andlýðræðisskoðanir. Ella yrði nasisminn hættulegur. Poul Andersen, prófessor í lögfræði, minnti þá á fræg orð Grundtvigs gamla, að frelsið væri ekki síður frelsi Loka en Þórs. Taldi hann erfitt að skilgreina, hvað væru andlýðræðisskoðanir.

Þessar umræður voru einkennilegar. Nasisminn var aldrei hættulegur í Danmörku. Hann hafði mjög lítið fylgi. En hefði átt að banna einhverjar andlýðræðisskoðanir (sem ég tel ekki), þá voru það skoðanir kommúnista, sem vildu koma á alræði og gengu erinda erlends stórveldis, Rússaveldis Stalíns.

Á heimasíðu, sem Háskólinn í Árósum heldur uppi fyrir ungt fólk um Danmerkursögu, er mikið efni úr þessum lýðræðisumræðum (demokratidebatten). Þar er þó ekki framlag Pouls Andersens, þótt greinar sumra kommúnistanna, sem þar eru birtar, séu einmitt andsvör við henni. Ég skrifaði ritstjóranum og benti á þetta. Hún svaraði mér kurteislega, að auðvitað ætti grein Andersens heima þarna, en hún hefði birst í Politiken, og erfitt gæti orðið að útvega leyfi fyrir henni. En margar aðrar greinar í umræðunum og á heimasíðunni birtust líka í Politiken. Áttu dönsk skólabörn aðeins að heyra sumar raddir?

(Fróðleiksmoli í Morgunblaðinu 5. nóvember 2023.)

Nú er komið í ljós, að það var ekki Ísraelsher, sem réðst á Al-Ahli sjúkrahúsið í Gaza 17. október 2023, heldur hafði ein af eldflaugunum, sem hryðjuverkasamtökin Jihad skutu á Ísrael, bilað, fallið niður á bílastæði við hlið sjúkrahússins og sprungið. Talið er, að um 50 manns hafi látist, en ekki 500, eins og Palestínumenn sögðu fyrst. Furðu sætir, að fjölmiðlar skyldu hlaupa til og birta athugasemdalaust fullyrðingar hryðjuverkasamtaka. Hefðu þeir gert það, þegar nasistar Hitlers og kommúnistar Stalíns áttu í hlut? Eða Norður-Kórea á okkar dögum, sem enginn trúir?
Fráleitt er að setja jafnaðarmerki á milli Ísraels og hryðjuverkasamtaka. Ísrael er eina lýðræðisríkið í Miðausturlöndum. Ísraelsmenn hafa unnið kraftaverk við að græða upp eyðimerkir og smíða hugbúnað. Þeir eru vissulega harðir í horn að taka, en það hefur bitur reynsla kennt þeim. Lítil frétt á dögunum sagði allt, sem segja þurfti. Hryðjuverkasamtökin Hamas hótuðu að taka gísla af lífi, ef Ísraelsher hætti að vara við árásum, svo að óbreyttir borgarar gætu forðað sér.
Það er þyngra böl en tárum taki, þegar saklaus börn falla í átökum. En Ísraelsher verður ekki kennt um mannfallið í Gaza, heldur Hamas, sem nota börn sem lifandi skildi. Hér á við lögmálið um tvennar afleiðingar, sem heilagur Tómas af Akvínas setti fram í Summa Theologica (II. bók, II. hluta, sp. 64, gr. 7). Í sjálfsvörn hyggjast menn aðeins bjarga eigin lífi, en aðgerðir þeirra skaða hugsanlega aðra, þótt sú hafi ekki verið ætlunin. En er aðalatriðið ekki að búa saklausum börnum heim, þar sem ekki sé barist, heldur skipst á vöru og þjónustu öllum í hag? Þar sem menn hætti við að skjóta á náungann, af því að þeir sjá í honum væntanlegan viðskiptavin? Það vilja hryðjuverkasamtök eins og Jihad og Hamas alls ekki.

(Fróðleiksmoli í Morgunblaðinu 28. október 2023.)

Heimspekingar hafa mjög velt fyrir sér merkingu orðsins „þjóð“. Minn gamli lærifaðir Karl R. Popper hafnaði þjóðernisstefnu með öllu, taldi hana ættbálkahugsun endurborna. Hann kvað ekkert dæmi til um raunverulega þjóð, nema ef vera skyldi Íslendinga, en þeir sæju þó ekki sjálfir um varnir sínar. Sir Isaiah Berlin hélt því fram, að þjóðarvitund yrði oftast til í sjálfsvörn, þegar einn hópur teldi annan lítillækka sig eða kúga. Ernest Gellner rakti þjóðarhugtakið til nútímans, þéttbýlismyndunar og iðnvæðingar, þar sem einstaklingar þyrftu að skilgreina sig. Benedict Anderson taldi þetta ímyndað hugtak, sem hefði verið skapað, eftir prentvélin kom til sögu. Anthony D. Smith reyndi að sætta þá kenningu, að þjóðin væri nútímafyrirbæri, og hina, að hún ætti sér sögulegar rætur.

Sjálfur er ég þeirrar skoðunar, að franski sagnfræðingurinn Ernest Renan hafi á nítjándu öld skilgreint best, hvað sé þjóð. Það sé hópur, sem af einhverjum ástæðum telji sig eiga heima saman, aðallega, en ekki alltaf, vegna að hann eigi sér eigin sögu og menningu og deili tungu. Eitthvað hafi fært þennan hóp saman um langan aldur, myndað samvitund hans, þjóðarvitundina. Ég er því ósammála þeim, sem telja þjóðerni nútímalegan tilbúning. Sighvatur skáld orti þegar árið 1018 um íslensk augu, sem hefðu vísað sér um brattan stíg. Samkvæmt þessu eru Íslendingar þjóð. Hið sama er að segja um Gyðinga, sem hafa árþúsundum saman vitað af sér sem þjóð, raunar sem útvalda þjóð, og deila trú og tungu. Það er hins vegar vafamál, hvort Palestínumenn séu þjóð. Þeir voru Arabar, sem búsettir voru öldum saman í Tyrkjaveldi og árin 1920–1948 á umboðssvæði Breta við Miðjarðarhaf. Þeir vissu ekki af sér í aldanna rás sem þjóð, þótt ef til vill hafi það breyst síðustu áratugi. Þeir eru sennilega ímyndað hugtak í skilningi Andersons.

(Fróðleiksmoli í Morgunblaðinu 21. október 2023.)

Einn kunnasti auðlindahagfræðingur heims, bandaríski prófessorinn Gary Libecap, flytur föstudaginn 20. október fyrirlestur í hátíðasal Háskóla Íslands klukkan fjögur um fiskveiðar frá hagfræðilegu sjónarmiði, hagkvæmustu nýtingu fiskistofna og eðlilegustu sjónarmið við úthlutun aflaheimilda í fiskveiðum. Er ekki að efa, að lestur hans verður forvitnilegur, en hann hefur skrifað margt um svokallaða afareglu (grandfathering) við úthlutun afnotaréttar af auðlindum.

Greining Gordons á sóun í fiskveiðum

Fiskihagfræðin varð til, þegar kanadíski hagfræðingurinn H. Scott Gordon birti tímamótaritgerð árið 1954, þar sem hann reyndi að skýra, hvers vegna fiskveiðar væru lítt arðbærar, þótt fiskimið væru víða gjöful. Skýringin var í fæstum orðum, að aðgangur væri ótakmarkaður að fiskimiðum, þótt fiskistofnar væru takmarkaðir. Gordon hugsaði sér fiskimið, sem nokkur fiskiskip sæktu. Fyrst ykist heildaraflinn með aukinni sókn, þegar nýtt fiskiskip bættist við. Heildaraflinn næði síðan hámarki við ákveðna sókn, tölu fiskiskipa, og eftir það minnkaði hann og þá um leið heildartekjur af fiskveiðunum. Línan um afla og aflatekjur væri því eins og bogi í laginu, byrjaði og endaði í núlli. Kostnaðurinn af sókninni ykist hins vegar reglulega með hverju nýju fiskiskipi. Línan um kostnað væri því bein lína upp á við. Við ótakmarkaðan aðgang að þessum fiskimiðum bættust ný fiskiskip við, uns kostnaður yrði jafnmikill tekjum, en eftir það var ekki eftir neinu að slægjast. Þegar þessu marki væri náð, væru fiskveiðar á fiskimiðunum reknar á núlli, án gróða, kostnaður orðinn jafnmikill og tekjur. Hér hef ég dregið upp einfalt línurit, sem sýnir fiskveiðar við óheftan aðgang samkvæmt þessari greiningu Gordons, sem raunar er óumdeild. Í þessu dæmi ná heildartekjur hámarki við 10 báta, en bátunum mun við óheftan aðgang fjölga í 16 báta, þar sem rekstur verður á núlli. Hagkvæmast væri hins vegar að gera út 8 báta, því að þar er lengst milli tekna og kostnaðar, heildargróðinn mestur. Hin sorglega niðurstaða er, að 16 bátar eru að landa minni afla en 8 bátar gætu gert. Enn sorglegra er, ef sóknin eykst umfram 16 báta, til dæmis vegna ríkisstyrkja, og stofnarnir hrynja, eins og við 20 báta. Þetta hefur sums staðar gerst.
Gordon notaði greiningu sína til að skýra, hvers vegna fiskiskipaflotinn yxi alls staðar langt umfram það, sem hagkvæmast væri. Ótakmarkaður aðgangur að takmarkaðri auðlind ylli jafnan ofnýtingu hennar. (Þetta hefur bandaríski vistfræðingurinn Garrett Hardin kallað samnýtingarbölið, the tragedy of the commons.) Þess má geta, að danski hagfræðingurinn Jens Warming, prófessor við Kaupmannahafnarháskóla, sem kenndi mörgum íslenskum hagfræðingum, hafði birt svipaða greiningu á offjárfestingu og sóun í fiskveiðum árið 1911, en hún var á dönsku og fór því fram hjá öðrum en Norðurlandabúum. En þegar að fornu höfðu Íslendingar fundið ráð við samnýtingarbölinu á öðru sviði, eins og prófessor Þráinn Eggertsson hefur lýst. Bændur í sama hreppi nýttu jafnan afréttir saman, ráku fé upp á fjöll á sumrin til beitar. Þá var nokkur freisting fyrir hvern einstakan bónda að reka of marga sauði á fjöll, því að kostnaðurinn af ofbeit dreifðist á alla bændurna, en ábatinn af aukasauðum hirti bóndinn einn. Þá var gripið til ítölunnar svokölluðu. Hver bóndi mátti aðeins telja ákveðinn fjölda sauða í afréttina. Þetta var auðvitað ekkert annað en kvóti, og fylgdi hann hverri jörð. Þetta var takmörkun á grasnytjum til að koma í veg fyrir ofbeit.

Ráðið við samnýtingarbölinu í fiskveiðum

Samnýtingarbölið í fiskveiðum var hliðstætt samnýtingarbölinu í íslenskum afréttum að fornu: Hver útgerðarmaður freistaðist til að bæta nýju fiskiskipi við, uns kostnaður var orðinn jafnmikill og tekjurnar, rekstur á núlli. Það voru of mörg skip að eltast við fiskana í sjónum, af því að aðgangur að takmarkaðri auðlind var ótakmarkaður. Íslendingar römbuðu síðan á ráð við þessu svipað og við ofbeitinni forðum. Síldin hvarf á sjöunda áratug, eflaust vegna ofveiði. Þá voru síldveiðar bannaðar í nokkur ár, en síðan ákveðinn hámarksafli árið 1975. Fékk hvert skip að veiða tiltekið hlutfall hámarksaflans á vertíðinni. Þetta var í raun fyrsti kvótinn. Hann varð síðan framseljanlegur, svo að eigendur síldarbátanna gætu hagrætt hjá sér. Svipað gerðist í loðnuveiðum nokkrum árum síðar.
Þorskur og annar botnfiskur voru erfiðari viðfangs, vegna þess að fiskiskipin, sem sóttu í þá, voru af misjafnri stærð og gerð, og mislangt var frá miðum. Þó var ljóst, að takmarka varð aðgang þar, eftir að _svartar skýrslur“ fiskifræðinga um ofveiði litu dagsins ljós eftir miðjan áttunda áratug. Íslendingar öðluðust þá líka yfirráð yfir Íslandsmiðum eftir nokkur þorskastríð við Breta. Smám saman varð til kvóti í botnfiski svipaður þeim, sem þegar hafði verið settur á í uppsjávarfiski (síld og loðnu). Hann var fólginn í því, að ákveðinn var hámarksafli á hverri vertíð í hverjum fiskistofni, en síðan var einstökum útgerðarfyrirtækjum úthlutað aflahlutdeild í þessum hámarksafla eftir aflareynslu áranna á undan. Ef fyrirtæki hafði til dæmis landað 5% af heildaraflanum í þorski árin á undan, þá fékk það 5% hlutdeild í leyfilegum hámarksafla í þorski. Aflaheimildirnar í öllum fiskistofnum urðu varanlegar og seljanlegar með heildarlögum árið 1990, fyrir 33 árum. Hafa þær síðan gengið kaupum og sölum, og er nú svo komið, að þorri aflaheimilda einstakra útgerðarfyrirtækja er aðkeyptur, yfir 90%. Íslendingar höfðu fundið ráð við samnýtingarbölinu. Þeir höfðu takmarkað aðgang að takmarkaðri auðlind. Og þeir höfðu fundið eðlilegustu úthlutunarregluna, að takmarka aðganginn við þá, sem höfðu stundað veiðar, enda var mest í húfi fyrir þá.

Aðrir ekki sviptir neinum rétti

Með kvótanum var tapi snúið í gróða í fiskveiðum á Íslandsmiðum, því að nú gátu útgerðarmenn skipulagt veiðarnar skynsamlega, ákveðið sóknina eftir því sam hagkvæmast var. Þeir þurftu ekki að hamast við að landa sem mestum afla á sem skemmstum tíma án tillits til kostnaðar. Víða erlendis er sjávarútvegur þungur baggi á skattgreiðendum, en hér er hann sjálfbær og arðbær. Það voru líka merk tímamót árið 2008, þegar enginn drukknaði við fiskveiðar í fyrsta sinn í Íslandssögunni. En samt sem áður eru ekki allir ánægðir með kvótakerfið. Sagt er, að aðrir hafi verið sviptir réttinum til að veiða, þegar hann var takmarkaður við þá, sem höfðu verið að veiðum, þegar kerfið var tekið upp. En hvaða réttur var það? Það var eins og Gordon og Warming höfðu leitt út með glöggum rökum aðeins réttur til að gera út á núlli, og sá réttur var samkvæmt skilgreiningu einskis virði. Það myndaðist þá og því aðeins gróði af fiskveiðum, að aðgangur að hinni takmörkuðu auðlind yrði takmarkaður. Sá gróði var ekki tekinn af neinum, því að hann myndaðist við lægri tilkostnað (eins og sést á línuritinu, þegar bátunum fækkar úr 16 í 8). Sumir seldu sína aflahlutdeild og hættu veiðum, og það var einmitt æskilegt, því að of margir höfðu verið að veiðum. Eftir urðu þeir, sem best voru fallnir til að veiða.
Einnig er sagt, að ríkið hefði í upphafi átt að úthluta aflahlutdeildinni á uppboði. En hagfræðingar setja jafnan eitt skilyrði fyrir breytingu á leikreglum. Það er skilyrðið um Pareto-hagkvæmni. Breytingin þarf helst að vera öllum í hag eða að minnsta kosti engum í óhag. Uppboð hefði verið mjög í óhag þeim, sem hefðu ekki getað keypt aflahlutdeild af ríkinu á uppboðinu og verið þá um leið sviptir lífsviðurværi sínu í einu vetfangi. Þetta var því Pareto-óhagkvæm breyting. Hitt var miklu eðlilegra að úthluta öllum, sem verið höfðu að veiðum, aflahlutdeild í samræmi við aflareynslu þeirra árin á undan. Þá breyttust hagir þeirra lítt, og þeir gátu síðan smám saman lagað sig að nýjum aðstæðum, sumir haldið áfram veiðum og keypt kvóta af öðrum, sem hætt hefðu veiðum af fúsum og frjálsum vilja. Þetta var Pareto-hagkvæm breyting. Allir græddu. Enginn tapaði. Þetta má orða svo: Valið var um tvo kosti. Annar var að fækka fiskiskipum með því að leyfa öllum að halda áfram veiðum, en búa svo um hnúta, að sum útgerðarfyrirtæki gætu keypt önnur út á markaði. Hinn kosturinn var að fækka fiskiskipum með því, að ríkið byði upp aflaheimildirnar, svo að fjöldi útgerðarfyrirtækja hefðu orðið frá að hverfa, en fjárfestingar þeirra og mannauður orðið að engu á svipstundu. Auðvitað varð fyrri kosturinn fyrir valinu.

Þjóðinni í hag

Hagfræðingar (og raunar allir upplýstir menn) eru sammála um, að nýting náttúruauðlinda sé jafnan hagkvæmust við einhvers konar einkaafnotarétt eða eignarrétt, enda er nú vandinn einmitt sá að sumra sögn á Íslandi, að útgerðarmenn græði. En spurningin er, hvernig eðlilegast sé að koma slíkum einkaafnotarétti á. Gestur okkar og fyrirlesari á föstudag, Gary Libecap, kallar það afaregluna, þegar miðað er við fortíðina og afnotarétti úthlutað til þeirra, sem haft hafa lengi afnot af þeirri auðlind, sem í hlut á. Hugmyndin er sú, að þá verði fyrirtæki ekki fyrir mikilli röskun á starfsemi sinni. Þau geti nýtt sér uppsafnaða þekkingu og kunnáttu. Þetta er einnig líklegast til samkomulags. Menn sætta sig frekar við að fá að halda áfram starfsemi en að hrekjast út við að bíða lægri hlut á uppboði. Hafa þeir Gary Libecap og prófessor Ragnar Árnason birt saman í erlendum vísindatímaritum fróðlegar ritgerðir um afaregluna. En afareglan þarf ekki að eiga alls staðar við. Þegar ný gæði koma skyndilega til sögu, sem enginn hefur nýtt (til dæmis olía í Noregi eða Alaska), geta önnur sjónarmið verið eðlileg, sérstaklega ef gæðin eru ekki endurnýjanleg.
Ein spurning í viðbót er áleitin. Hvernig nýtist þjóðinni best sá arður, sem myndast hefur í fiskveiðum við kvótakerfið? Svarið er, að líklega nýtist henni arðurinn best með núverandi fyrirkomulagi. Útgerðarfyrirtækin greiða skatta og gjöld og kaupa aðföng, og á því græða aðrir. Þau skapa störf og stuðla að nýsköpun (sem óvíða er meiri í sjávarútvegi en á Íslandi). Þetta kerfi er ekki fullkomið, en ekki hefur verið bent á neitt skárra. Íslenskur sjávarútvegur þarf líka að vera samkeppnishæfur við erlenda keppinauta, sem njóta ríflegra ríkisstyrkja. Raunar lagði ég til, þegar verið var að lögfesta kvótann árið 1990, að útgerðarfyrirtækin seldu hlutabréf í sér á hóflegu verði, svo að allir gætu notið beint fiskveiðiarðsins sem hluthafar, en ekki aðeins óbeint, eins og nú er. Hitt er óvíst, hvað yrði um fiskveiðiarðinn, ef ríkið hrifsaði hann til sín með eignarnámi kvótans og útleigu hans. Það eru hin herfilegustu öfugmæli að kalla það markaðslausn, að ríkið eigi auðlindir og leigi út afnotarétt. Fjörugur markaður hefur verið með aflaheimildir í þessari grein allt frá upphafi kvótans. Líklegast væri, ef ríkið tæki kvótann af útgerðarfyrirtækjunum, að fiskveiðiarðurinn minnkaði verulega og kæmi síðan aðallega að notum þeim, sem mest áhrif hefðu á stjórnmálamennina, vel skipulögðum og háværum hagsmunahópum. Ríkið er því miður ekki alltaf þjóðin.

Heimildir:

Terry L. Anderson, Ragnar Árnason og Gary D. Libecap, Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management, Annual Review of Resource Economics, 3. árg., nr. 1 (2011), bls. 159–179.

James M. Buchanan, Who cares whether the commons are privatized? Post-Socialist Political Economy: Selected Essays (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997), bls. 160–167.

Þráinn Eggertsson, Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millennium of Common Mountain Pastures in Iceland, International Review of Law and Economics, 12. árg. (1992), bls. 423–437.

H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, Journal of Political Economy, 62. árg., nr. 2 (1954), bls. 124–142.

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162. árg., nr. 3859 (1968), bls. 1243–1248.

Jens Warming, Om »Grundrente« af Fiskegrunde, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift, 19. árg., nr. 4 (1911), bls. 499–505.

(Grein í Morgunblaðinu 19. október 2023.)